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Abstract
Religious fundamentalism is observed across the world. We survey evidence on
religious fundamentalism and then investigate its roots by reporting agent-based sim-
ulations of religiosity dynamics in a spatially dispersed population. Agents’ religiosity
responds to neighbors via direct interactions as well as via club goods effects. A
simulation run is deemed fundamentalist if the final distribution contains a cohesive
subset of agents with very high religiosity. We investigate whether such distributions
are more prevalent when model parameters are shifted to reflect the transition from
traditional societies to the modern world. The simulations suggest that the rise of
fundamentalism in the modern world is aided by weaker attachment to the peer group,
greater real income, and less substitutability between religious and secular goods, and
arguably also by higher relative prices for secular goods and lower tolerance. Surpris-
ingly, the current model suggests little role for the rise of long distance communication
and transportation.
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1 Introduction
In 1920, Curtis Lee Laws, an editor of the American Baptist publication Watchman-Examiner
first coined the word “fundamentalism” to describe groups eager to defend what they saw
as the fundamentals of the Christian Protestant faith (Hood et al. 2005). Since then, the
word has been applied more broadly to include a Shia branch of Islam in Iran after the
1979 revolution, Hindutva adherents in India in the 1990s, and many other groups. Indeed,
all major religions now have vocal (and in some cases, violent) groups of adherents who
reject much of modern world culture and urge a return to the pure fundamentals of their
faith. Although the groups — which include Catholic traditionalists, Jewish haredim, Sunni
salafi, and even groups of Buddhists in Burma and Japan — seem likely to remain minorities
within their religions, they demand our attention. Some of these groups have an outsized
influence in national politics, and several are pivotal in some of the world’s most intractable
international conflicts.
Why did fundamentalism take root in so many parts of the world during the late 20th
century? What underlying forces determine the size and influence of fundamentalist groups?
These are deep questions unlikely to be answered fully in any single investigation. In the
present paper, we first survey the evidence on religious fundamentalism across the world and
then seek initial insight from a simulation model.
Simulations complement but do not substitute for other approaches. The researcher
builds known features into the simulation and looks for emergent behavior that, although
perhaps unexpected at first, can on reflection improve intuition about how the known features
interact. Simulations are appropriate here because we want to consider a wide range of
possible answers to our questions. We hope that our results will help future work focus more
sharply on narrower ranges of answers that are amenable to other approaches, including case
studies, econometric analysis of historical data, and analytical models.1
Our simulation model traces the “religiosity” of individual agents over time in a spatially
1 Some simulation models, e.g., those used by the weather service or the Federal Reserve, are intended
to produce quantitative short-run predictions. Since we are concerned with phenomena that do not yet
have such well established theory and empirics, our aim is less ambitious: to gain some qualitative long run
insight.
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dispersed population. The agents interact directly with others and also within peer groups.
In the direct interactions, the agents are intolerant of those with very dissimilar religiosity
and so their religiosity moves even further apart, but it moves closer together when agents
with sufficiently similar religiosity interact. This similar/dissimilar feature is motivated by
psychology literature dating back at least to Lord et al. (1979). The peer group interaction
features are motivated by club goods models in the tradition of Iannaccone (1992); the
basic idea is that people who contribute to a religious community also benefit from the
contributions of other members.
As a result of both sorts of interaction, the distribution of agents’ religiosity evolves over
time. We run simulations long enough for the distribution to settle down. The long-run
distribution is deemed fundamentalist if, roughly speaking, it contains a cohesive subset of
agents with very high religiosity.
We seek to investigate how modernity can affect religiosity. The simulation model there-
fore includes parameters that can capture aspects of modernity such as the decline of social
capital, the progress in communication and transport technology, and the growing incompat-
ibility of religious and secular activities. The simulations show how shifts in such parameters
can affect the prevalence of fundamentalism.
Section 2 discusses religious fundamentalism across the world including possible defi-
nitions of fundamentalism. Section 3 discusses the changes in society that are associated
with modernity, and reviews the related literature. Section 4 introduces the simulation
model. Section 5 presents simulation results showing the comparative static impact of key
parameters, and connects those parameters to contrasts between traditional societies and the
modern world. Section 6 summarizes the insights gleaned from the exercise, and suggests
future research directions.
Appendices A and B contain supplementary material. Appendix A provides a summary
of the parameters of the model. Appendix B describes the simulation code in greater detail
and includes additional comparative static results.
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2 Religious Fundamentalism Across the World
It would be desirable to begin with a generally accepted operational definition of fundamen-
talism, but there is considerable debate about what fundamentalism really is. Iannaccone
(1997) notes that even the multi-volume Fundamentalism Project by Marty and Appleby
(1991) was less clear on providing a clear definition of fundamentalism and objective cri-
teria for categorizing religious movements as fundamentalist or non-fundamentalist. In our
reading of this literature, the key characteristics shared by most fundamentalist movements
include a belief in the inerrancy of scripture, an unwillingness to compromise, setting sharp
boundaries between members and non-members, behavioral requirements, militancy, and
charismatic leadership (see, e.g., Emerson and Hartman 2006).
Originally, the term “fundamentalism” was coined to describe a group of theologically
conservative American Protestants in the late 19th and early 20th century. It is thought
that the term was first used in 1920 by Curtis Lee Laws, who was an editor of Watchman-
Examiner, a conservatist Baptist publication. It was meant to describe those Protestants
”who were ready to defend the fundamentals of the faith” (Hood et al. 2005). Since then,
the term has often been used in the context of movements in other parts of the world
in other periods of time, such as Iran after the 1979 revolution and India in the 1990s.
Consequently, there are two ways of understanding ”fundamentalism”: in a narrow sense
and in a broad sense. A narrow definition of ”fundamentalism” refers only to the original
Protestant movement in the United States. Proponents of the broader definition apply it
to movements in other religions as long as they share the same or similar characteristics, in
particular a strong belief in the central tenets (”fundamentals”) of the faith.We conducted
case studies of four movements which can be described as ”fundamentalist” and briefly
outline each of them in terms of doctrine, history, and distinctions from other movements.
First, we consider Protestant fundamentalism in the United States.This movement de-
veloped from around 1870 to 1925 (Emerson and Hartman 2006). The main characteristic
of Protestant fundamentalists is their belief in the inerrancy of the Bible in all aspects, in-
cluding the creation of the world, the virgin birth of Jesus Christ, and the promise of his
eventual return. These and other central beliefs were outlined in a series of essays entitled
The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, which were published between 1910 and 1915
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(Hood et al. 2005). It was this title which later helped establish the terms “fundamentalism”
and “fundamentalists”. The movement declined somewhat after 1925 when the American
Protestant fundamentalists were humiliated in the famous trial of John Scopes, a young
biology teacher who was accused of teaching evolution in schools in Tennessee (Marty and
Appleby 1991). Woodberry and Smith argue that only a small part of today’s conservative
Protestants in the US can be described as ”fundamentalists.” Instead, as Hood et al. (2003)
writes, many conservative Christians in the US use the term “evangelicals” to describe them-
selves, and most academics agree that “fundamentalists” and “evangelicals” constitute two
different groups, despite some similarities.
Second we consider Islamic fundamentalism. Defining “fundamentalism” in the context
of the Islamic religion is problematic because the belief in inerrancy of the Muslims’ sacred
text, the Quran, is not a good criterion. The reason is that, as Ruthven (2012) points
out, “virtually all believing Muslims — not just those described as ‘fundamentalists’ —
see the Quran as the eternal unmediated Word of God.” Lewis (1998) argues that Islamic
fundamentalists “base themselves not only on the Quran, but also on the Traditions of the
Prophet, and on the corpus of transmitted theological and legal learning.” Fundamentalism
in the Sunni branch of Islam developed for example in Egypt. As Marty and Appleby (1991)
write, the beginnings of modern fundamentalism in Egypt can be traced back to the first
decades of the 20th century and to the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.
The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the sources of members for the Egyptian fundamentalist
movement, which was still rather weak during the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the
1950s and 1960s. The movement grew in power in the 1970s under Anwar Sadat’s presidency
and in the 1980s. The assassination of Sadat by fundamentalists in 1981 is often seen as a
symbol of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt (Marty and Appleby 1991). Fundamentalism
in another branch of Islam – Shi’ism – developed in Iran as a reaction to secularization
under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (Almond et al. 2003) and grew rapidly after the
Iranian revolution in 1979 under the charismatic leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. It should
be mentioned that there are also other terms which are often used in similar contexts to
“Islamic fundamentalism,” e.g., “Islamism”, “political Islam”, and “militant Islam” (see
Kramer (2003) and Sonn (2006)).
Third, we consider Hindu fundamentalism in India. The movement is represented by
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two non-governmental organizations: the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and the VHP
(Vishna Hindu Parishad), as well as by a major political party - the BJP (Bharatiya Janba
Sangh), which is closely linked to the RSS. Hindu fundamentalism differs from Abrahamic
(i.e. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic) fundamentalisms in that there is no unified scripture,
inerrancy of which members could believe in. However, the book Hindutva, written by
Vinayak Savarkar, the leader of the RSS, and published in 1922, provides a doctrine for
Hindu fundamentalists in a similar way to the Bible for Christians or the Quran for Muslims.
The book describes the concept of “Hindutva” (”Hinduness”) which “defines the geographic,
racial, and religious boundaries of Hinduism” (Almond et al. 2003). Hindu fundamentalism’s
origins can be seen in nineteenth-century movements like Brahmo Samaj and Arya Samaj
(Keddie 1998). The movement grew rapidly in the 1980s, which is shown by an increase
in active membership in the RSS from 1,000,000 in 1979 to 1,800,000 in 1989 (Marty and
Appleby 1991). The BJP party won the largest number of seats in the Indian parliament for
the first time in 1996. Despite a decline in popularity in the 2000s, it won over 51 percent
of seats in the 2014 elections.
Finally, we consider Pentecostalism in Latin America. There is no consensus whether
Pentecostalism is a “fundamentalism”. It is undoubtedly a distinct movement from the
original Protestant fundamentalism but it has several characteristics of a fundamentalist
movement, including the belief in inerrancy of the scripture (i.e. the Bible). Hood et al.
(2005) mention that some Pentecostals even describe themselves as “fundamentalists”. What
makes Pentecostals different from the original Protestant fundamentalism is that the former
attach more importance to the direct experience of God through the Holy Spirit, which takes
the form of, for example, speaking of tongues, healing, and prophesying (Robbins 2004).
Put briefly, “fundamentalists emphasized doctrine; Pentecostals - experience” (Woodberry
and Smith 1996). Pentecostalism emerged at the beginning of the 20th century from the
Holiness movement, which was a branch of evangelicalism (Woodberry and Smith 1996). The
so-called Asuza Street Revival in 1906-1909 (i.e. the preaching by William Seymour in an
abandoned church on Asuza Street in Los Angeles) is considered by scholars as the birth of
Pentecostalism (Robbins 2004). Currently, Pentecostalism is growing rapidly in many parts
of the world, especially in Latin America and Africa.
In this section we described case studies of four fundamentalist movements across the
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world. These experiences allow us to distill certain characteristics of fundamentalism that
are appropriate for economic analysis, as discussed below.
2.1 Characteristics of Religious Fundamentalism
We now summarize the main characteristics of movements which can be described as “fun-
damentalist.” This analysis is based on Almond et al. (2003), Emerson and Hartman (2006),
and the preceding discussion of our case studies of four fundamentalist movements. It should
be emphasized that this list is not exhaustive; however, most of the fundamentalist move-
ments share the vast majority of these characteristics, if not all.
1. Belief in inerrancy of scripture. Fundamentalists believe that their scripture has
divine origin and is true in all aspects (Almond et al. 2003). This refers to sacred texts such
as the Bible for Christian fundamentalists and the Quran for Islamic ones, but also to the
“Hindutva” for Hindu fundamentalists.
2. Unwillingness to compromise. Fundamentalists are often unwilling to compromise
not only on religious issues but also on the secular ones. This is connected with the belief in
inerrancy of the scripture. For example, the Quran and the Shari’a law are seen by Islamic
fundamentalists as rules which cover all areas of life and cannot be changed regardless of the
circumstances.
3. Separatism. It is a standard practice of fundamentalists to set sharp boundaries be-
tween members and non-members. This dualistic worldview is an important feature of, for
instance, the “Hindutva”: everyone who acknowledges ties to ancient India is included in
the movement (even Sikhs, Jains, and untouchables), but Christians and Muslims are con-
sidered enemies (Keddie 1998). For Islamic fundamentalists, it is the Western culture in
general which is seen as an enemy.
4. Behavioral requirements. Members of fundamentalist movements are required to
follow specific behavioral requirements in various domains, such as worship, attire and diet.
There are plenty of examples of such requirements, e.g., prohibitions on certain foods in
Islam and the requirement to tithe and give offerings in Pentecostalism.
5. Militancy and active evangelization. Fundamentalists often engage in active evan-
gelization (e.g., Protestant fundamentalists in the US and Pentecostals), which can even be
considered as militant. However, this militancy does not necessarily mean that violence is
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being used.
6. Authoritarian organization and charismatic leadership. It is common for funda-
mentalist movements to have a more authoritarian structure than other religious movements
and that they are centered around a charismatic figure. The leader can be more global
(like Ayatollah Khomeini for Islamic fundamentalists) or more local (like local preachers in
Pentecostal churches in Brazil).
7. Millenialism and messianism. Many fundamentalist movements believe that the
world will have a miraculous and positive end. The end will be accompanied by a golden age
of 1000 years (hence “millenialism”) and by the coming of a Messiah (hence “messianism”).
This is particularly characteristic of Abrahamic religions (Almond et al. 2003).
8. Provision of social life and welfare services. Fundamentalist movements strive to
provide benefits for their members, which can take various forms, such as building schools
(e.g., by Protestant fundamentalists in the US) or even simply organizing regular occasions
for group life (e.g., neighborhood meetings in the RSS in Hindu fundamentalism and exu-
berant worship services in Pentecostalism).
9. Alienation from the rest of the society. Alienation of fundamentalists from the
rest of the society arises mainly for two reasons. First, new members are often drawn from
isolated subpopulations by offering them better life. In most cases, this refers to lower classes
of the society (e.g., in Pentecostalism), but in the case of Iran it was the educated young
middle class that was alienated by the modernization and secularization program of Reza
Shah Pahlavi and subsequently attracted by Sunni fundamentalists. Second, the alienation
is a result of the already mentioned practice of setting sharp boundaries between members
of the movement and the others.
10. Reaction to modernity and secularization. The emergence of fundamentalism is
often considered a response to modernity and secularization. For example, the Protestant
fundamentalism in the US is said to have emerged “in reaction to rapid urbanization and
industrialization, the spread of secular education and science, the decline of belief in sacred
texts and religious tradition, and attenuating religious discipline” (Almond et al. 2003).
Sunni fundamentalism in Egypt grew as a response to secularization efforts of Nasser in the
1970s, whereas the Shi’ite fundamentalism in Iran was largely triggered by rapid seculariza-
tion under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi.
For our present purposes in terms of economic analysis, we can distill the more complex
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aspects of fundamentalism down to two key characteristics. First, fundamentalists have a
very high level of religiosity in comparison to the rest of the society. That religiosity is
usually expressed by an unwavering attachment to a set of core beliefs, e.g., in the inerrancy
of scripture. Second, fundamentalists form a relatively cohesive group in terms of the level of
religiosity. This cohesion is typically achieved by introducing a set of behavioral requirements
— e.g., for worship, attire, and diet — for the members, and a sharp boundary between
members and non-members. We operationalize this verbal definition in Section 4 below.
3 What is Modernity and How Can We Incorporate It
in Simulations?
We should clarify what we mean by modernity, and how it is to be represented in our sim-
ulations. The simulations hold constant a set of exogenous parameters that represent the
ambient social environment, and they track the evolution of agents’ religiosity against that
constant backdrop. For us, modernity refers to a large and interconnected set of modifi-
cations to traditional societies. Our approach is to run some simulations with a vector of
exogenous parameters intended to represent aspects of traditional society, and compare them
to other simulations that use modified exogenous parameters intended to represent aspects
of the modern world, e.g., industrialization, urbanization, and secularization of education
and leisure. For example, Protestant fundamentalism in the United States is said to have
emerged in reaction to rapid urbanization and industrialization, the spread of secular educa-
tion and science, the decline of belief in sacred texts and religious tradition, and attenuating
religious discipline (Almond et al. 1995). Sunni fundamentalism in Egypt grew in the 1970s
as a response to the secularization efforts of Gamal Abdel Nasser, whereas Shi’ite fundamen-
talism in Iran was largely triggered by rapid secularization under the reign of Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi (Marty and Appleby 1991).
The aim of this paper is to study how changes brought by modernity may have led to the
emergence of fundamentalism. We now list several changes associated with the transition to
modernity that our simulations seek to capture; see Section 5.2 for further discussion.
1. Decline of social capital. This process was famously studied by Putnam (1995, 2000),
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who found that at the end of 20th century people belonged to fewer civic organizations and
met with family and friends less often than in earlier decades.
2. Progress in communication and transport technology. Over the last 200 years,
the world has witnessed an unprecedented progress in these two domains, with developments
of the telephone, radio, television, the Internet, trains, automobiles, planes, etc.
3. Increase in wealth. Most of the world saw an unprecedented growth in per capita
wealth and improving living standards in the 20th century and early 21st century.
4. Growth of secular and religious opportunities. Modernity has brought many new
opportunities both in the secular (e.g., in entertainment and tourism) and the religious (e.g.,
televised worship events, more affordable travel to pilgrimage sites) domains. mostly thanks
to the progress in communication and in transport. In some countries (notably Turkey,
Egypt and Iran), authorities in the early to mid-twentieth century imposed secularization.
5. Religious activities becoming less compatible with the demands of secular
activities. Educating children, observing holidays, and assisting those in need are examples
of activities that traditionally combine religious and secular motives, but in the modern world
these activities tend to occur in separate spheres. Also, the pace of modern life increases the
opportunity cost of religious behavioral requirements.
6. Impact on tolerance. Modernity has arguably had an impact on how tolerant people
are towards those who are different from them, e.g., in terms of the level of religiosity.
Our simulations try to capture such modifications via shifts in parameters, and then
show the impact on the long-run distribution of religiosity.
In doing so, our paper adds to a rapidly maturing literature on the economics of religion
(Iyer 2016). We draw on club goods models of religion, following the seminal paper by
Iannaccone (1992). In Iannaccone’s model, individuals choose how much effort and other
scarce resources to allocate to secular activity and how much to participation in the religious
club. Each individual benefits from the quality of the religious club, which is determined
by the members’ overall participation level. By imposing behavioral requirements, religious
clubs increase the cost of secular activity, which can be thought of as a tax on such activity.
The paper shows that, despite imposing unproductive costs, these behavioral requirements
can in fact increase the club members’ equilibrium welfare.2 More recent club models of
2 The effectiveness of unproductive costs in increasing participation in clubs and increasing individual
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religion include Berman (2000) and Chen (2010), among others. Iannaccone (1997) discusses
his club model of religion in the context of religious fundamentalism.
We extend Iannaccone’s (1992) model in several ways. First, our agents interact via a
spatial network, in which each individual agent is affected most by nearest neighbors. Second,
in addition to club interactions, our agents also interact directly with their neighbors. Third,
to widen the focus from an individual group or club to the national or world level, we modify
the payoff function to directly incorporate the impact of a club’s idiosyncratic behavioral
requirements. Finally, our simulation is dynamic, and we trace how the religious participation
of individuals evolves over time as they interact with each other in the network. Although
our agents and interactions are quite different from theirs, Iannaccone and Makowsky (2009)
and Makowsky and Rubin (2013) use a methodology similar to ours to examine how different
exogenous parameter vectors impact aggregate behavior.
Our paper also adds to the literature on religious extremism and fundamentalism, which
includes club models of religious fundamentalism (Iannaccone 1997, Berman 2000), and
models of religious strictness (McBride 2015, Levy and Razin 2012), and connects with the
literature on secularization and on simulation models of religion (Shy 2007). Within these
strands of literature, our paper is most closely related to studies of the emergence and spread
of religious extremism or fundamentalism. We are aware of only five such papers, as follows.
(Arce and Sandler 2003, Arce and Sandler 2009, Epstein and Gang 2007, Makowsky 2011,
Makowsky 2012). Our paper aims to help fill this gap in the literature.
Arce and Sandler (2003) study the evolutionary stable equilibria of a game in which
members of a general subpopulation are matched with members of a fundamentalist sub-
population and the matched pair then plays a Nash demand game. The Nash demand game
could be interpreted as a game in which players decide on their shares of social control
(over norms, religion, etc.). Arce and Sandler (2009) consider a similar model and intro-
duce assortativity of pairwise matching, which allows them to study the role of isolation of
fundamentalist groups.
Epstein and Gang (2007), like us, model religiosity as a single continuous variable that
welfare is documented empirically by Aimone et al. (2013), who test a simplified club good model in lab
experiments. The paper also provides evidence for endogenous group formation, which is not relevant to the
current version of our model.
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reflects the level of observance. They consider a population which consists of a leader of a
sect and his followers. The leader faces a trade-off when choosing the optimal required level
of observance: increasing the level of observance increases the followers’ dependence on him,
but as the level becomes higher and higher, some people may choose to leave because the
costs are too high.
Makowsky (2012), like us, spatially embeds a club model of religion. Unlike us, he uses
a cellular automaton, with agents located on a two-dimensional uniform lattice. Instead of
a continuous religiosity variable, he assumes a fixed set of religious groups, each requiring a
particular level of sacrifice from its members, and labels as “extremist” the groups with the
highest levels of required sacrifice. Initially, agents are randomly assigned to groups, but in
each later round, an agent evaluates all groups in her neighborhood in the lattice and joins
the utility-maximizing one. The model suggests that extremist groups are most successful
when religious groups can produce goods that are close substitutes to secular goods.
Our paper differs from Makowsky (2012) in several respects. Our model examines fun-
damentalism (not synonymous with extremism)and has endogenous levels of religiosity, more
flexible neighborhoods and a much wider variety of interactions. Makowsky (2011) omits
the spatial aspects but otherwise has a setup similar to Makowsky (2012). Our own analysis
focuses instead on how a bimodal distribution of agents’ commitment to their religious clubs
can emerge in the population.
4 Simulation Model
Our model traces the behavior over time of a fixed number of agents, stylized representations
of individuals or families. Each agent i = 1, ..., N is described at any time t = 1, ..., T by
her physical location Li and her degree of religiosity ri(t) ∈ [0, 1]. In this paper, we hold
Li constant over time but simulate adjustments in religiosity ri(t) due to interactions with
other agents. The analysis focuses on the distribution of religiosity in the long run, after the
distribution seems to have reached stochastic equilibrium.
Our verbal definition of fundamentalism combines the group trait “extremely high level
of religiosity in comparison to the rest of the society” with “cohesive ... in terms of the level
of religiosity.” To operationalize that definition, we use a standard statistical package (the R
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0             1 
Lower Mode: μ2      Upper Mode: μ1 
 
Distance 
Figure 1: Operational Definition of Fundamentalism. A religiosity distribution exhibits fundamen-
talism (F = 1) if the position µ1 of the upper mode, and the distance µ1 − µ2 between the upper
lower modes are each sufficiently large.
algorithm expectation maximization, EM) to estimate a mixture of two normal distributions
for a simulation’s final religiosity levels ri(T ), i = 1, ..., N . Let µ1 and µ2 denote respectively
the upper and lower estimated modes. Then we say that the distribution exhibits (weak)
fundamentalism (F = 1) if
i. µ1 > 0.8, i.e., the upper mode is at a high level of religiosity, and
ii. µ1 − µ2 > 0.2, i.e., the upper mode of religiosity is noticeably higher than the lower
mode.
If either condition fails, we will say that the distribution fails to exhibit fundamentalism
(F = 0). It will sometimes be helpful to say that a distribution exhibits strict fundamentalism
(F̂ = 1) if, in addition to conditions i and ii above, the following condition holds
iii. the standard dip test of Hartigan and Hartigan (1985) for bimodality rejects the null
(unimodal) hypothesis at p-value less than 0.10.
Condition iii ensures that the two groups are separated, not just by distance between typical
members as in ii, but also in terms of cohesion: there is a relatively small overlap of the
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members’ level of religiosity. The critical p-value does not seem very important; p = 0.05
produces qualitatively similar results. See Figure 1 for a schematic illustration.
Our definition of (weak) fundamentalism captures religious extremism, both in absolute
and relative sense. That is, for a distribution to exhibit (weak) fundamentalism, there must
be a substantial group of agents who have an extremely high level of religiosity in absolute
terms as well as relative to the rest of the population. A high level of religiosity can be
understood here as a high attachment to the set of core beliefs, e.g., in the inerrancy of
scripture, and high involvement in the religious community, e.g., through participation in
religious and social events, active evangelization, etc. A notable implication of this definition
is that a population where all agents are very religious is not classified as fundamentalist.
We think that is appropriate because such uniformity seems less likely to provoke political
and social discord.
Our definition of strict fundamentalism requires that fundamentalists form a group that
is not only extremely religious in absolute and relative sense, but is also cohesive. Thus the
presence of agents with extreme religiosity is not enough; they also need to have a relatively
similar level of religiosity. Such similarity is often achieved by fundamentalist movements
through imposing behavioral requirements in domains such as worship, attire, and diet, and
through setting sharp boundaries between members and non-members.
4.1 Overview of Simulation Procedure
The model begins by assigning initial locations and religiosities. The initial locations are
assigned randomly and uniformly on the unit sphere, and directed links are created according
to geodesic distance, using parameters described below. Locations and link strengths are
permanent. Initial religiosities are independently uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1].
Figure 2 shows a small example with N = 20 agents.
Once initialized, the simulation updates agents’ religiosities as follows. In each iteration,
a directed link (from agent A, say, to agent B) is selected at random, with probability
proportional to the link strength. The religiosity of agent A is then updated incrementally
via a small independent normally distributed random “noise” term n; a direct interaction








Figure 2: An Example of Simulation Initialization. The surface of the sphere is shown in Mollweide
projection, a pseudo-cylindrical view that preserves areas but (especially towards the poles) distorts
angles. Religiosities ri(0) are color-coded from yellow (near 1.0) to dark violet (near 0.0).
involves the religiosity of all A’s neighbors. Then another iteration is performed by selecting
another link at random.
Since religiosity is bounded above by 1 and below by 0, the increments cannot be additive.
We use essentially multiplicative increments tailored to respect the upper and lower bounds,
implemented using the following variant on the log function. Each iteration deterministically
transforms the chosen agent A’s religiosity r ∈ [0, 1] to a value R ∈ [−∞,∞] via the function
R = ln r
1−r , then updates to R
′ = R + C + D + n, and finally transforms back to obtain
agent A’s new religiosity r′ = L(R′) ∈ [0, 1] via the inverse function L(x) = exp(x)
1+exp(x)
=
(1 + exp(−x))−1. Thus, when C + D + n = 0, we have r′ = L(R(r)) = r, and religiosity is
unchanged. The transformations are order-preserving and smooth, and updates C + D + n
are almost always small, so each iteration the increments r′− r are also almost always small.
The next two subsections explain the update terms C and D in more detail.
Figure 3 tracks religiosities in a sample simulation of N = 20 agents for T = 1 million
iterations. Note that two distinct groups soon emerge in this simulation, but they never
become widely separated and the top group always has mean religiosity less than 0.8. Hence,
according to our definition, fundamentalism did not emerge in this simulation (F = 0).
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Figure 3: Simulation Example. Number of agents is N = 20, with T = 1, 000, 000 iterations;
other parameters are at default values. Black dotted lines trace religiosities for individual
agents, and the red solid line is their overall mean.
4.2 Direct Interaction Parameters
The direct interaction term D arises from an agent’s links to neighboring agents, and the
size of the neighborhood is governed by parameter K ∈ [0, 1]. An agent has a link to every
other agent located within geodesic distance d ≤ K so, for example, everyone in the same
hemisphere is a neighbor when K = 0.5. The default value when N = 100 is K = 0.16,
implying that a typical agent has about three neighbors.
Link strengths decrease in the distance d between a pair of agents; the strength is
proportional to dbd , where the distance sensitivity parameter bd ∈ [−3, 0] has default value
−1.0. We use the “small world” technique (Watts and Strogatz 1998) of breaking each local
link with probability β ∈ [0, 0.5] and replacing it with a link to an agent selected at random
irrespective of distance. The idea is that a few long distance links can greatly shorten the
indirect paths connecting distant agents, e.g., two agents on opposite sides of the world
might now both be neighbors of some agent with a long distance link, and thus be fairly
closely connected. To avoid attenuating this small world effect, we introduce a new distance
sensitivity parameter bsm ∈ [−2, 0] that applies to replacement links; the baseline value is
bsm = 0, i.e., no attenuation. Thus link strength is governed by parameters K, β, bd and bsm.
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The tolerance parameter λ ∈ [0, 1] plays an important role. Once the link ij is chosen
for updating (with probability proportional to its strength), the direct interaction effect is
given by the equation
D = q(ri − rj)[(ri − rj)2 − λ2]. (1)
Baseline tolerance is λ = 0.20 ± 0.02, i.e., each agent’s λ is drawn independently from a
Normal distribution (truncated to [0, 1]) with mean 0.20 and standard deviation 0.02. If
the religiosities of the two agents differ by more than λ, the expression in square brackets
is positive, so D increases ri when it exceeds rj and decreases it otherwise. In other words,
the direct interaction drives i’s religiosity further away from j’s. The intuition is that j is
a negative role model, and his lack of religiosity (or excessive religiosity) drives i to become
more (or less) religious. On the other hand, if the two agents’ religiosities differ by less than
λ, then the direct interaction effect D brings them closer together.
The idea behind the tolerance parameter λ goes back at least to the psychology literature
on biased assimilation. For example, Lord et al. (1979) reports evidence that people are
more likely to be influenced by someone whose opinion is close to theirs, and they often reject
opinions which are very far from their own. As discussed in Section 5.2 below, subsequent
literature has confirmed similarity-attraction/dissimilarity-repulsion empirically and justified
it theoretically.
The parameter q ∈ [0, 1] in equation (1) governs the importance of direct interactions
relative to peer group effects, to which we now turn.
4.3 Club Goods Parameters
The other term C in our simulation model is based on the club goods model of Iannaccone
(1992). The peer group (or “club”) consists of all agents linked to the given agent; let Q be
the link strength-weighted average of their religiosities. The model assigns to each agent the
utility function and the budget constraint
U(r, S|Q) = [Sb + crabQ(1−a)b] s.t. prr + psS = I. (2)
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Thus, utility is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of secular activity S and
religious subutility,3 where the latter is a Cobb-Douglas function (with parameter a) of own
religiosity r and the mean religiosity Q in the peer group.
The parameter b controls the substitution elasticity η = 1
1−b between S and religious
subutility. Note that η > 0 for b ∈ (0, 1) and η → ∞ as b → 1−. That is, secular and
religious goods are imperfect substitutes for b < 1 and become perfect substitutes at b = 1.
For b > 1 we see that η < 0, i.e., the two sorts of goods are anti-substitutable.4 In the
simulations reported below, c in equation (4) is not another exogenous parameter; instead,
it is a variable tuned so that club goods payoff is maximal when r = Q. The idea is to
streamline Iannacone’s model by absorbing into the payoff function the impact of individual
groups’ behavioral requirements. See Appendix B.2 for details.
Our parametrization holds constant the price level ps of ordinary (“secular”) goods and
varies nominal income I and the relative price p = pr/ps of religious goods. We assume that
each agent’s income is drawn from a lognormal distribution with mean log income µI and
standard deviation of log income σI . Baseline values are b = 0.8, a = 0.3, P = ps = 1, p =
pr = 0.55, µI = 1, and σI = 0.1.
The convention in equation (2) is that the budget constraint always binds, so we can
write S = I−prr
ps
= Y − pr and rewrite the payoff function (2) as
φ(r|Q) = (Y − pr)b + crabQ(1−a)b. (3)
The peer group update C then is the scaled payoff gradient
C = 4(1− q)∂φ(r|Q)
∂r
= 4(1− q)[abcrab−1Q(1−a)b − bp(Y − pr)b−1]. (4)
The update (4) thus captures the idea that agents adjust their religiosity incrementally to
improve their sense of well-being, taking into account the relative benefits of both secular
3 CES production functions raise the bracketed expression in (2) to the power 1/b. That transformation
is unnecessary here because, for the parameter values b > 0 used below, it is monotone increasing and so the
resulting utility functions represent the same underlying preferences as U .
4 Anti-substitutable means that compared to two distinct bundles of the goods that bring equal satisfac-
tion, a middling bundle brings lesser satisfaction. More formally, if U(X) = U(Y ) for two bundles X 6= Y ,
then for any mixture Z = mX + (1 −m)Y with 0 < m < 1, we have U(Z) < U(X) = U(Y ) when b > 1.
Of course, when 0 < b < 1, we have the usual convexity property that U(Z) > U(X) = U(Y ), meaning that
mixtures are preferred.
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activity and (given their peer group) religious activity, and also taking into account relative
costs and available resources. The factor 4.0 neutralizes the way the R function scales at
midrange (i.e., it compensates for dR
dr
(0.5) = 0.25), and the factor 1−q reflects the importance
of peer group update C relative to direct interpersonal influence D.
4.4 Incentives, Optimization and Equilibrium
In what sense do agents in our model respond to incentives? The club goods elements of
our model provide the same sort of incentives as in other models in the Iannaccone (1992)
tradition. The direct interaction elements create the incentive to have religiosity more like
close neighbors who are not too different, but to contrast even more sharply with sufficiently
dissimilar neighbors.
As in most dynamic agent-based models, agents in our model respond incrementally to
incentives. They do not fully optimize immediately, but rather move religiosity up or down
at a rate determined by the net impact of incentives that iteration. Eventually, as behavior
settles down after sufficiently many iterations, some sort of equilibrium is achieved.
How many is ‘sufficiently many,’ and what sort of equilibrium? In preliminary work,
we increased the number of iterations until it seemed that the religiosity distribution had
typically settled down, and then doubled that number to T = 4 million iterations for the
main results presented below. A more formal name for a settled distribution is ‘stochastic
equilibrium.’ The stochastic element, embodied in a small positive value of the parameter
σ, keeps the simulation from getting stuck at unrepresentative local equilibria, and thus
provides some robustness. In any iteration of this long-run equilibrium, we may not have all
agents precisely optimizing their religiosity given the incentives created by their neighbors,
but the agents will closely and robustly approximate such optima.
5 Results
We begin by showing the impact of varying key parameters one at a time from baseline values
N = 100, T = 4, 000, 000, K = 0.16, β = 0.05, bd = −1, bsm = 0, λ = 0.2 ± 0.02, q =
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0.8, a = 0.3, b = 0.8, ps = 1, pr = 0.55, and σ = 0.0005, with lognormally distributed
income I where µI = 1 and σI = 0.1. Most of these parameter values have already been
explained; here we note that (given the typical neighborhood size), q = 0.8 seems to roughly
equalize the impact of the C and D effects, and noise level σ = 0.0005 seems sufficient
to avoid meaningless stagnation while keeping negligible the impact of particular random
realizations.
The figures in the next subsection report summaries of 50 Monte Carlo simulations for
each parameter vector. The small dots in the left side panels plot the final (period T )
estimated upper and lower modes of agent religiosity in each trial simulation, and the large
dots average these across all 50 Monte Carlo trials. The right side panels plot the fraction






















Figure 4: The impact of parameter q (weight of direct (vs peer group) interactions) on the estimated
upper and lower modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
Panel B of Figure 4 indicates that, near default values of parameters, the prevalence
of fundamentalism is surprisingly sensitive to the balance between direct interaction and
club goods. Increasing the weight q on direct interactions to 0.85 (from default value 0.80)
increases the fraction of Monte Carlo trials exhibiting strict fundamentalism, F̂ , from about
60% to above 90%. On the other side, when q is below 0.75, hardly any trials exhibit
strict fundamentalism and even weak fundamentalism is uncommon. Panel A shows how
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increasing q sharply increases bimodality, as the more religious group moves towards maximal
religiosity, and the lower group towards atheism. Evidently, unless tempered by club goods
effects, direct interactions tend to push towards polarization (and hence fundamentalism) in
our model with baseline parameters.
To better understand the push towards fundamentalism, consider the impact of varying
the typical size of a neighborhood. Panel B of Figure 5 shows an increase in strict funda-
mentalism (from around 30% to nearly 60%) as the neighborhood radius K increases from
0.07 to the default value of 0.16, and no clear trend with further increases to 0.25. The
upper value implies about (.25/.16)2 ≈ 2.44 times the area, i.e., on average more than twice
as many neighbors as in baseline, while K = 0.07 is so small that many agents have no
neighbors and so retain essentially their initial religiosity. Panel A shows that increasing
K tends to increase the lower mode (slightly reducing the chance of meeting criterion ii of
fundamentalism), but below the baseline value of K = 0.16, it also tends to increase the
upper mode (increasing the chances of meeting criterion i).
Figure 5: The impact of parameter K (neighborhood radius) on the estimated upper and lower
modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
Another parameter controlling the influence of more distant agents is the long-distance
rewiring parameter β. Default parameter values ensure that the long-distance links have
about the same weight as the local links. Panel B of Figure 6 shows that increasing the
prevalence of long-distance links from 3 to 7% has very little impact on fundamentalism,
and Panel A indicates little effect on the underlying mode distributions. Thus, apart from a
clear increase in fundamentalism associated with increases in K up to the baseline value of
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Figure 6: The impact of parameter β (probability of long-distance connections) on the estimated
upper and lower modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
Let us now examine the tolerance parameter λ. Recall that direct interactions tend to
push neighbors’ religiosity towards each other when λ is large, and indeed Panel A of Figure
7 suggests that distributions become more moderate (and unimodal) as the average value of
λ increases. Below the default level 0.20 we see rather polarized distributions and more than
60% of trials exhibit strict fundamentalism. At higher values of lambda, the upper and lower
modes move towards each other, so criteria i and ii are less likely to be satisfied and strict
fundamentalism appears in less than 20% of trials. Simulations varying the dispersion of λ
from zero to two times its baseline value of 2% (with other parameters at baseline values)
show very little impact. We conclude that the average tolerance level is what matters in our
simulations, and fundamentalism is less likely to appear when agents are more tolerant of
others’ differing levels of religiosity.
Turning to parameters controlling the peer group effects, we see from Panel B of Figure 8
that fundamentalism declines substantially as the relative price p = pr/ps of religious goods
increases from below to above the baseline value of 0.55. This would seem natural to an
economist, but Panel A shows that the story has some nuance. As one would expect, the
upper mode decreases in p, but only modestly. By contrast, the lower mode increases in p;
evidently the income effect outweighs the substitution effect.
Figure 9 examines income effects directly over the range from 50% below to 50% above


















Figure 7: The impact of parameter λ (tolerance) on the estimated upper and lower modes of

















Figure 8: The impact of parameter p (relative price of religious goods) on the estimated upper
and lower modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
stantially over this range, from about 35% to about 65%. The proximate reason, seen in
Panel A, is that lower income enforces a more moderate distribution of religiosity, while
higher income results in some agents choosing more extreme levels of religiosity (or secu-
larity) and increased bimodality. It seems that poor people cannot afford ostentation in
religious (or secular) display, while polarizing forces have more room to operate at higher
income levels. That is, agents with high income can afford a mixed bundle of the two goods
that involves a very high consumption of one of the goods. Simulations not shown here con-
firm that, when other parameters are at baseline values, the prevalence of fundamentalism
is insensitive to varying income dispersion σI from zero to three times its baseline value of
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0.10.
Figure 9: The impact of parameter µI (median log income) on the estimated upper and lower
modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
Figure 10 shows that, when the CES parameter b is less than its default value of 0.8 (and
other parameters are at default settings), there is a tendency towards unimodal distributions
of moderate religiosity. The estimated upper and lower modes of religiosity are not far apart
and even the former is usually less than 0.8, so strict fundamentalism is rare and even weak
fundamentalism is uncommon. However, increasing b to 1.0 and beyond has a strong impact:
the population tends towards polarization, and most simulations are deemed fundamentalist.
Indeed, for b = 1.2, well over 90% of trials exhibit strict fundamentalism. We attribute this
to anti-substitutability which, as discussed in Section 4.3, makes agents prefer to consume
a single good rather than a mixed bundle. This tends to push towards corner solutions,
with some agents choosing extreme religiosity and others extreme secularity, as confirmed in
Panel A.
Finally, Figure 11 shows the impact of the Cobb-Douglas parameter a in religious subu-
tility. Higher a puts less weight on the peer group’s average religiosity and more on own
religiosity. Panel B shows that there is substantially more fundamentalism when a increases
much above its default value of 0.3. Evidently, putting lesser weight on the peer group once
again enhances polarization, as shown in panel A. On the other hand, putting greater weight
on it promotes a unimodal distribution of moderate religiosity. That is, as a decreases, the
peer group’s average religiosity plays a bigger role in each agent’s consumption decision and
















Figure 10: The impact of parameter b (substitutability of secular for religious goods) on the
estimated upper and lower modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism
(Panel B).














Figure 11: The impact of parameter a (weight of own (vs peer group) religiosity in an agent’s utility
function) on the estimated upper and lower modes of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of
fundamentalism (Panel B).
5.2 Capturing Modernity
The baseline parameter values were chosen to be reasonable empirically and to illuminate
how the model responds. Here we tie them more closely to the empirical literature and to
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the transition to modernity.5
Decline of social capital. It has been argued, most famously by Putnam (1995,
2000), that there has been a significant decline in the social capital over the last few decades.
Drawing on more than half a million interviews in the US conducted over 25 years, Putnam
found that fewer and fewer people belong to civic organizations, people know their neighbors
less well, and meet with their family and friends less often. Putnam offers several potential
explanations for these changes: suburbanization leading to more time spent by people on
travelling than on social activity, changes in the family structure such as a higher number
of single and childless people, and the technological transformation of leisure leading to
the “individualization” of leisure. More recent work generally confirms Putnam’s findings,
but adds nuance. For example, McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Brashears (2006) find that
most peer groups consist of rather similar individuals, where similarity increasingly reflects
educational attainment and decreasingly reflects race.
Our simulations capture such decline in social capital via increases in parameters a
(weight of own (vs peer group) religiosity in an agent’s utility function) and q (weight of
direct interactions relative to peer group interactions). The comparative static results show
that increases in either of these parameters above baseline values greatly encourage funda-
mentalism.
Progress in communication and transport technology. Over the last 200 years,
the world has witnessed an unprecedented progress in transport technology, with the advent
and global expansion of steamships, railroads, automobiles and airplanes. Communication
was revolutionized in the 19th century by the inventions of the telegraph and the telephone.
The early 20th century inventions of radio and television became widespread globally by the
late 20th century, and since then mobile phones and the Internet have become ubiquitous. For
example, Internet usage increased from 11% in 1997 to 81% in 2016 in the developed world
and from 2% to 47% in the global population (International Telecommunication Union data).
More recently, the usage of social media such as Facebook and Twitter has mushroomed. Pew
Research Center (2018) finds that 78% of 18- to 24-year-olds in America use Snapchat, and
a sizeable majority of these users (71%) visits the platform multiple times per day. Similarly,
71% of this age group now use Instagram and 45% use Twitter. Some have suggested that the
5 The parameters not discussed here (N , T , σ) are only simulation conventions.
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communications revolution has led to the “death of distance”, i.e., the reduction of the role
of distance in communications (Cairncross 2001). The role of various media in maintaining
relationships over long distances has been studied for example by Utz (2007).
These developments in communication and transport undoubtedly increased the inter-
action intensity between people physically distant from each other. In terms of the model,
it seems reasonable to say that modernity increases the parameters K (neighborhood size)
and β (probability of long-distance connections). Our model suggests that, up to a point,
increases in K can indeed increase the prevalence of fundamentalism. Surprisingly, the model
shows no impact for β, an issue we will revisit in the concluding discussion. Modernity may
also affect the distance sensitivity exponent bd, but the evidence is mixed. While Cairn-
cross’s (2001) “death of distance” claim amounts to saying that bd = 0 in modern times,
Bailey et al. (2018) analyze huge Facebook data sets and conclude that friendship link fre-
quency strongly declines in geographic distance.6 7 However, the debate has little impact on
our conclusions because over the relevant parameter ranges, the updates depend much more
sensitively on the number of neighbors, controlled by parameter K, than to the distance
attenuation parameter bd.
Increase in wealth. An important aspect of modernity is the increase in wealth and
improvement of living standards around the world. The 20th century witnessed unprece-
dented growth in real global GDP: it rose about 19-fold, which corresponds to an average
annual rate of growth of 3 percent; at the same time there have been major improvements
in other indicators of well being such as life expectancy and education.8 The proportion of
6 The estimated elasticities range from about 2.0 over distances less than 200 miles to about 1.2 for
distances larger than 200 miles. The latter is not far from our baseline value of -1.0.
7 Goldenberg and Levy (2009) study empirically the importance of geographic distance in social in-
teractions and also find that distance is not dead: the volume of electronic communications is inversely
proportional to geographic distance. In contrast, Kaltenbrunner and Scellato (2012) analyze online user
interactions and geographic proximity in a study of a large Spanish online social service, demonstrating
that while geographic distance strongly affects how social links are formed, it plays a negligible role in user
interactions. Some recent studies on massive interaction networks have observed a substantial impact of
administrative or socio-economic boundaries on human interactions (Ratti et al. 2010; Sobolevsky et al.
2013), indicating that geography still matters for interactions. Leetaru (2018) offers additional evidence
that, despite the developments in communication, geographical distance still matters.
8 IMF World Economic Outlook 2000.
26
global population with income less than $1.90 per day (2011 PPP) has decreased from over
42% in 1981 to less than 11% in 2013,9 and per-capita world real income has increased by
a factor of 10 over the last two centuries (Bolt et al. 2014). Trends in income inequality
are mixed: within-country measures of inequality dropped sharply in most major economies
over most of the 20th century but since have increased, while inequality across countries
moved in the opposite directions (Friedman and McNeill 2013, p.216, 250).
Lognormal income distributions are a standard simplification, and recent evidence con-
firms that they are good empirical approximations except at the extreme upper tail (Clementi
and Gallegati 2005). Normalizing median log income to 1.0, we obtained the estimate
σI = 0.0924 by fitting the lognormal distribution to raw 2017 US income percentile data.
Hence our baseline choice σI = 0.1 is realistic. It turns out that changes in σI have minimal
impact on the prevalence of fundamentalism in our model. By contrast, our model suggests
that the unequivocal large increase in median income in the modern world played a major
role in the rise of fundamentalism.
Growth of secular and religious opportunities. Modernity has arguably improved
both secular and religious opportunities, and so lowered the effective price ps of secular
goods as well as the price pr of religious goods.
10 Mass production, trade, and progress in
communication and transport surely lower ps, as do easier access to entertainment, tourism
and other services. Advances from Gutenberg’s printing press to televangelism and mobile
messaging likewise have lowered pr, as has easier access to worship (e.g., through television
or to travel to pilgrimage sites).11
Overall, the effect of modernity on the relative price p = pr/ps is ambiguous. We suspect
that on balance it has lowered that price. If so, the model offers this as an additional
9 World Bank data: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/poverty.
10 The interpretation of parameters ps and pr as shadow prices of secular and religious activities (or
“commodities”) is outlined in detail by Iannaccone (1992).
11 For example, the invention of the printing press played an important role in providing easier access to
the ideas of the Protestant Reformation and in the ensuing spread of this religious movement in Europe. The
connection between the printing press and the spread of the Protestant Reformation is examined empirically
in Rubin (2014). Rubin (2017) contrasts Europe and the Middle East, among others, by comparing the
expansion of the Protestant Reformation in the former, where the printing press became widely used quickly,
with the lack of such a movement in the latter, where the religious establishment prevented the spread of
the printing press.
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economic explanation for fundamentalism in the modern world, as fundamentalism becomes
quite frequent in our simulations as p falls below its baseline value of 0.55 but becomes rare
at much higher values of p.
Growing incompatibility of religious and secular activities. In modern times,
religious activities are becoming less compatible with the demands of secular activities.
Educating children, observing holidays, and assisting those in need are examples of activities
that traditionally combine religious and secular motives, but in the modern world they tend
to occur in separate spheres. The variety and scope of new secular opportunities, together
with nondecreasing requirements for religious activities, makes the two spheres more difficult
to reconcile. For example, Muslims need to fast during the Ramadan, follow the Shari’a law
as well as many rules specified in the Quran, including prohibitions on certain foods, a number
of legal rules concerning family law, criminal law, and commercial regulations (Ruthven
2012). As discussed by Iannaccone (1992), religious movements such as Krishnas, Jehovahs
Witnesses, Mormons, and others involve religious practices which are socially stigmatizing
and hence also difficult to reconcile with the modern world. Forced secularization, imposed
by authorities in many parts of the world, also increases incompatibility. An example is
Iran under the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose policy concentrated on de-emphasizing
the Islamic component in education and other domains (Marty and Appleby 1991).
That religious goods can be substitutable with secular goods provided by the market and
secular goods provided by the state has been established empirically (Gruber and Hungerman
2006, Hungerman 2005). Makowsky (2011, 2012) argues that increases in the substitutability
between religious and secular goods will increase bimodality of the population, and increase
the percentage of extremists. Our simulations confirm that substitutability parameter b has
those sorts of impact. Indeed, going a bit further, we argue that the modern world may be
characterized by anti-substitutability (b > 1). The point is that it is harder than ever to mix
religious and secular education, and that the distinction has never been sharper between
secular state provision and religious community provision of health care, disaster insurance
and other public goods. Our simulations show that anti-substitutability sharply increases
the frequency of fundamentalism, because agents then tend to choose a very high (or very
low) level of religiosity rather than an intermediate one.
Tolerance. There is substantial evidence on people being attracted to (or tolerant
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of) similar others and repulsed by (or intolerant of) dissimilar others in various domains,
including religion.12 Modernity has likely changed people’s tolerance of those with dissimilar
levels of religiosity, but we are not aware of data that can identify the strength or even
the direction of the impact. Public support for civil liberties, such as freedom of religion
and expression, has generally increased in the United States over the last few decades. For
example, the support for allowing an anti-religionist (somebody who is against all churches
and religion) to make a speech rose from 66.1% in 1972 to 76.4% in 2012. However, the impact
varies across demographic groups. For those with education at college level or higher, the
proportion has slightly fallen from 92% in 1972 to 88.9% in 2012 (NORC, 2012). Overall,
one might expect that the impact of modernity on tolerance varies significantly across and
within societies.
In our model, it seems reasonable to say that the impact of modernity on the mean
tolerance parameter λ is ambiguous. The variability may well have increased, but this has
little impact on the model’s predictions. Wherever the net effect of modernity is a decrease
in mean tolerance, we have yet another explanation for the emergence of fundamentalism.
6 Discussion
Why has fundamentalism become so prevalent in the modern world? Our approach to
this question can be summarized briefly. First, we curated the evidence on fundamentalist
movements across the world and identified their key characteristics. Then, we suggest that
fundamentalism is present when there is a coherent minority of the population that is highly
religious, and substantially more so than the majority. We compare the prevalence of funda-
12 As mentioned earlier, the literature on this topic dates back at least to Lord et al. (1979). The
mechanisms of attraction to similarity and repulsion from dissimilarity have been studied for example by
Skvoretz (2013), who explores these two mechanisms as drivers of intra- and intergroup relations using data
on interethnic marriages in the UK and the US; on US dating and cohabitation relations by religion and
education; and on educational diversity in marriages in 22 European countries. Other studies exploring
similarity attraction and dissimilarity repulsion such as Berscheid and Walster (1969), Byrne (1971), and
Rosenbaum (1986) show that in general people are most attracted to others who share similar important
attitudes, such as attitudes concerning home and family rather than those who share less important attitudes.
See also the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (2018).
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mentalism across simulations of our model as we vary parameters defining direct interactions
and peer group interactions.
The simulations suggest that several aspects of modernity may play an important role.
The modern world is characterized by lower social capital, higher per capita income and
more contact with more distant agents, and the corresponding parameter changes greatly
boost fundamentalism in our simulation model. Modernity has made secular and religious
activities less complementary, and perhaps even “anti-substitutable,” which again boosts
fundamentalism. The impact of other aspects of modernity is less clear. Tolerance and the
relative price of religious versus secular goods are important drivers of fundamentalism in
our model, but it is hard to say which way modernity pushes them.
The model highlights the interplay of two different influences on agents’ religiosity: pair-
wise direct interaction with neighbors (D), and peer effects from participation in group ac-
tivities (“club goods”, C). In our model, the direct interactions tend to polarize (at baseline
values of the tolerance parameter) but, to achieve the necessary coherence for fundamen-
talism, it seems that peer effects are also required. Conversely, society tends to become
less polarized, and fundamentalism less likely to emerge, when direct interaction extends to
larger neighborhoods and so peer groups’ initial average religiosity is more moderate. In
these and other ways, the interplay of C and D is much richer than we imagined when we
first constructed the model.
As is often the case with simulation models, some of our results surprised us at first.
Increases in mean income boost fundamentalism far more than we expected, although in
retrospect the mechanism (involving unbalanced baskets containing both religious and secu-
lar goods) makes economic sense. We were also puzzled by two null results. The inequality
parameter σI has no discernible impact on fundamentalism, perhaps because of offsetting
effects. The ambiguous impact of modernity on inequality reduces the urgency of solving
that puzzle. The other puzzle is the essentially null impact on fundamentalism of very long
distance links, via the “small world” parameter β. Perhaps again there are offsetting effects,
or perhaps the effects appear only when the number of agents is far larger.
Our model can be extended in many ways. The definition of fundamentalism can be
tweaked, by changing the thresholds or the method of identifying separate modes. The im-
pact of two or three times as many agents can be assessed. Appendix B.2 collects some
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exercises of this sort; they generally suggest that our results are robust. A bit more ambi-
tiously, one could make the world less isotropic: agent location clusters could capture the
impact of oceans and mountains and other natural barriers. Simulations could also capture
network dynamics, which for simplicity we have neglected. The link weights, and perhaps
agents’ locations, could be allowed to evolve, to capture the idea that most people prefer to
associate with like-minded individuals. This increased complication regarding direct inter-
actions probably would require streamlining the peer interactions, but it might lead to new
insights. Another important limitation of the present model is that we consider only a single
religion. More complicated simulations might consider the interaction of alternative faiths.
Thus, we do not regard the present simulation model as the final word, but rather as
an exemplar of a promising approach. In connection with other approaches, we hope that it
gives new insight into many questions regarding the distribution of religious behavior within
a population, including how and when fundamentalism can take root.
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N number of agents on the
sphere
100 (50, 250)
T number of iterations of
the simulation
4,000,000
σ noise amplitude in up-




K size of each agent’s
neighborhood






Center (2018), Ratti et al.
(2010), Sobolevsky et al.
(2013), Utz (2007)
β probability of an
agent’s neighborhood
link being deleted and
rewired with a random
agent on the sphere
0.05 (0.03, 0.07)
bd sensitivity to distance
in neighborhood links:
higher absolute value
implies lower weight on
more distant agents
-1 (-2, 0)




Direct vs peer groups interactions parameter
q weight of direct update
term relative to peer
group term
0.8 (0.7, 0.9) Putnam (1995), Putnam
















(1969), Byrne (1971), Lord
et al. (1979), NORC
(2012), Rosenbaum(1986),
Skvoretz (2013)
Peer group interaction parameters
a weight attached by each
agent to own religiosity
(relative to the average
religiosity of connected
agents)
0.3 (0.1, 0.5) Putnam (1995), Putnam





fect, perfect, and anti-
substitutes respectively
for b < 1,= 1, > 1)







pr price of religious good 0.55 (0.45, 0.65) Iannaccone (1992)







Bolt et al. (2014),
Clementi and Gallegati
(2005), Friedman and
McNeill (2013), IMF World
Economic Outlook (2000)
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Appendix B.1: Code Description
The model is implemented in C++ and we describe the operation of the code here.
Inputs
As inputs the code takes two or three data files, plus several parameter values.
• The first data file specifies the initial state of the network, i.e., the initial religiosity
levels, {ri}, of the agents in the network.
• The second input file contains the various model parameters: q (weighting for direct
interactions versus club); λ (parameter characterizing direct interaction); a, b, pr, ps
(parameters characterizing club good interaction) and σ (standard deviation of the
noise term).
• The third optional input data file is the description of the network. This is a list of
node pairs plus weights describing the links that exist in the network and the relative
probability of an interaction occurring. If this file is omitted the code assumes we want
to use a completely connected network, i.e., every node has a link to every other node
and these links are all equally weighted.
• In addition, the user provides the name of an output data file, the number of itera-
tions (model updates) to perform and a random seed that will be used to initialize
the random number generators required for the probabilistic model updates to ensure
reproducibility of the results. The user can also optionally supply the value of the
distance weighting parameter, bd, used to specify the strength of the network links.
Variables
As the model runs, various network properties are tracked. These include the network char-
acteristics, i.e., all the links that exist in the network and their weights. In the simulations
described in this article, the network characteristics do not evolve over the simulation, but
the code supports that capability. The code also tracks various properties of each node. This
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includes their current religiosity, the location of their neighbours and the average religiosity
of their neighbours, used as the parameter Q in the club-good part of the update model.
The code also has the capability to support heterogeneous networks, with different values of
the model parameters, such as I, λ, a, b, pr and ps, for each agent. That feature was used
only for I and λ in the results reported in this article. The code also keeps track of various
average properties of the network.
Code Operation
The code structure is as follows.
• Initialization: on starting the code performs various initialization operations
– Read parameters from the command line.
– Read parameters describing the model from the model parameter file and initialize
the corresponding variables in the model.
– The natural log of income assigned to a given node is drawn randomly and in-
dependently from a normal distribution with assigned parameters (µI , σI). The
tolerance parameter assigned to a given node likewise is drawn from a normal
distribution with parameters (µλ, σλ and truncated above at 1.0 and below at 0.0.
– If a network file is provided, read the network description from the file and cre-
ate the network array structures to store the details. If not, generate network
structures describing a completely connected network.
– Create the arrays for storing the node properties. Read in the initial states of the
nodes from the input file and initialize the arrays.
– Opens files for output.
– Compute mean properties of the network and derived node characteristics, such
as the mean religiosity of neighbours for each node, as per the particular model
specification. Create arrays for storing network and node characteristics and
initialize.
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• Iteration: after initialization the code performs the number of iterations specified by
the user. This was T = 4, 000, 000 for the runs described in this article. On each
iteration the code performs the following steps
– Choose a link in the network at random, with weighting according to the current
weights of the various network links. This specifies the two nodes that interact at
this iteration and a direction, i.e., which node is ”A” and which is ”B”. After the
interaction, only the religiosity of A changes, but the size of the change depends
on the states of both A and B and the average state of neighbours in the network.
– Update the religious adherence of Node A according to the interaction model
described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. This is a combination of the direct interaction,
D, given in Eq. (1), the club good interaction, C, given by Eq. (4), and the normal
noise term, n. These give the update to the logit-transformed religiosity of agent
A, which is then converted to the new religiosity of the agent. Note that the club
good update depends on the mean religiosity parameter, Q, which is computed
as a weighted average over all nodes linked to agent A, with weights equal to the
weights on the corresponding legs of the network.
– Update the mean field parameters and derived node characteristics based on the
new state of the network.
– Write new state of network to output files.
The code runs for the specified number of iterations and then the files are post-processed
to compute the quantities required to assess whether the final state of the network meets
the criteria for Fundamentalism as defined at the start of Section 4.
Appendix B.2: Constructing c
The variable c in equation (2) is constructed to align club goods utility maximization with
Q, the current mean religiosity in the neighborhood. With c ≡ 1 as in Iannacone (1992),
club goods utility is maximized at some r < Q, reflecting the natural tendency to free ride on
others’ religiosity. Left unchecked, that tendency would eventually drive r to 0 in each group.
Iannacone’s point is that successful groups cope by raising the cost of secular goods to their
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members (not to the general public) via “stigma and sacrifice,”and he finds circumstances
under which such devices can stabilize religiosity at a high level within a cohesive group. Our
focus is different. In order to analyze how prices and incomes at the national or world level
(and other global parameters) affect the overall distribution of religiosity, we abstract from
specific internal stabilization devices and use c to enable club good utility to be stabilized
at a positive level that emerges endogenously and varies across groups. To do so, we seek,
for any given current value Q ∈ (0, 1), to maximize clubs good utility at r = Q. Writing the









This expression for c was used in all simulations described in this paper. Note that (with the
exception of low a) the value of c is not especially sensitive to parameters within the ranges
we consider.



























Figure 12: The impact of income inequality parameter σI on estimated upper and lower modes of
religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fund m ntalism (Panel B).
The text asserts that the income inequality parameter σI and the tolerance dispersion
parameter σλ have little impact. Figures 12 and 13 provide evidence.
Figure 14 shows a modest decline in the average location of both upper and lower modes
of religiosity, and a corresponding modest decline (mainly due to more frequent below-
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Figure 13: The impact of tolerance dispersion parameter σλ on estimated upper and lower modes
of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B).
threshold upper modes) in fundamentalism as the distance sensitivity parameter bd increases
from below its baseline value of -1.0 to above that value. The neighborhood size K is held
fixed in this exercise. The influence of the most distant neighbors is substantially less than
that of closest neighbors when db = −2 but rises to equality as db → 0.
Figure 14: The impact of distance sensitivity parameter bd on estimated upper and lower modes
of religiosity (Panel A) and on the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B), holding constant the
expected number of neighbors.
The reported simulations rather arbitrarily fix the number of agents at N = 100. To
check robustness of our results to that choice, we ran simulations with other values of N as
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shown in Figure 15. We vary K so as to hold constant the expected number of neighbors,13
and vary T proportionately with N so as to keep roughly constant the average number of
updates of each agent. Panel A of Figure 15 shows very little impact on the average location
of upper and lower modes as we vary N from half its baseline value to more than twice that
value. There does seem to be some subtle impact on the distributions around that average,
so that the rate of strict fundamentalism is slightly below 50% for the extremes N = 50, 250
instead of slightly above. Overall, however, the results seem insensitive to N .
Figure 15: The impact of parameter N (number of agents) on mean religiosity (Panel A) and on
the frequency of fundamentalism (Panel B), holding constant the expected number of neighbors.
13The expected number of neighbors is given by N(1 − cos(πK2 )), the relative spherical area times the
number of agents; with default values N = 100,K = 0.16 this implies just over 3 neighbors on average. The
simulations vary K inversely with N so as to keep that number constant.
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